Notes

People v. Hicks: Sentencing Laws and
Sex Offenses - A Disingenuous
Approach by the California Supreme
Court*
The California Legislature, over the past two decades, has been
developing a stiffer penal system in regards to the sentencing of sex
offenders. The California Supreme Court, during the 1980s, has
eagerly followed suit and, through the use ofjudicial interpretation,
has extended these sentencing statutes to their outermost limits.
However, over the past five years and, more recently, in December
1993, the California Supreme Court has exceeded the interpretive
limits of the sex offender sentencing statutes. The court, in People
v. Hicks, held that sex offenders are subject to multiple full-term
consecutive sentences for both non-sex and sex offenses in spite of
the potentially applicable statutory prohibition regarding multiple
punishment. This holding abuses the courts interpretive authority
and opens the door to a potential dramatic increase in sentences
that the legislature never intended.
·
I.

INTRODUCTION

Increasingly over the past decade, a main focus of the United States

* The student author gratefully acknowledges the guidance and assistance of
Professor Jean Montoya.
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criminal justice system has been on the penalization of sex offenders. 1
Recent legislative acts enhancing criminal sentences and judicial
decisions interpreting these acts reflect the heightened concern of
punishing sex offenders. One such example of a judicial interpretation
is the California Supreme Court decision, People v. Hicks .2
Hicks, as this Note will explain, has opened the door for prosecutors
to obtain longer sentences in criminal sex offender cases. Moreover,
Hicks is a perfect example of the California Supreme Court's unbound
use of the canons of statutory interpretation to achieve ends that the
California Legislature may have never intended.
This Note will first briefly explain the applicable California statutes
to a Hicks ' type of situation. Second, a brief history of the state of the
law preceding Hicks will be provided. Third, the actual Hicks decision
will be discussed. Fourth, a critical analysis of the Hicks decision will
be conducted. Finally, the Hicks decision's future effects on the criminal
justice system will be discussed.

IL

THE APPLICABLE STATUTES: CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTIONS

6543 AND 667.64
Two Penal Code statutes are at issue here. Understanding the way
that these statutes correlate with each other is imperative to understanding the court's holding and rationale in Hicks.
A.

California Penal Code Section 654

Section 654 of the California Penal Code, entitled "Offenses punishable in different ways by different provisions; double jeopardy,"5 states,
in pertinent part, "[a]n act or omission which is made punishable in
different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under
more than one. " 6 This statute, in its strict textual sense, prohibits
punishing a criminal twice for the same "act or omission." The Penal
Code provides different ways for sentencing a single act and section 654
is designed to safeguard the risk of a prosecutor or judge attempting to

1. For discussions on reform in this area of the law; see generally CASSIA SPOHN
AND JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM (1992); Public Hearing on Legal Problems of
Rape Before the California Legislature Senate Comm. on Judiciary (1987).
2. 6 Cal. 4th 784, 863 P.2d 714, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469 (1993).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1994).
4. Id. § 667.6.
5. Id. § 654.
6. Id. (emphasis added).
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invoke more than one of these methods. 7 The rationale behind section
654 is rooted in the double jeopardy clause of the United States
Constitution. 8
Despite section 654 's limited textual application only to "an act or
omission," this statute has been extended, through judicial interpretation,
to apply to much broader situations. The extension, often referred to as
the "Neal test,"9 makes section 654 applicable to situations where more
than one act was actually com.m.itted, but several of the acts were
conducted in what is called "an indivisible course of conduct" or
"indivisible transaction." 10 In other words, a criminal may be convicted
of several offenses, but he or she will only be sentenced for the crimes
in which the criminal had a separate intent for that crime. The criminal
will not be sentenced for crimes that were only incidental to his or her
main objective.11 As the California Supreme Court stated in Neal: "If
all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be
punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one." 12

7. For example, if a defendant committed and was convicted of a single act of
rape and a single act of sodomy, the court could impose a sentence for each crime.
However, if the prosecution also wanted to have the defendant sentenced for a general
le_wd and lascivious conduct conviction that was solely based on the rape and sodomy
acts, the court would be prohibited by section 654 to impose such a sentence because
the lewd and lascivious charge was based on the same acts as the rape and sodomy. See
People v. Siko, 45 Cal. 3d 820, 755 P.2d 294, 248 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1988).
8. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, in pertinent part, "nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This portion of the Fifth Amendment has been held to
be applicable to the individual states via the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969).
9. The name for this test is derived from the California Supreme Court case, Neal
v. California. 55 Cal. 2d 11,357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 823 (1961). However, Neal was not the first case to establish the legal principle
for which the case is famous. People v. Brown was the first case to establish the
doctrine now referred to as the Neal test. People v. Brown, 49 Cal. 2d 577, 320 P.2d
5 (1958).
10. Neal, 55 Cal. 2d at 19, 357 P.2d at 843, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
11. In determining whether the crimes were. part of an indivisible course of
conduct, "[i]t is defendant's intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his
offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible." People v. Harrison,
48 Cal. 3d 321, 335, 768 P.2d 1078, 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401, 409 (1989).
12. Neal, 55 Cal. 2d at 19, 357 P.2d at 844, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 612. The following
illustration may help eliminate any confusion as to what constitutes "an act or omission"
provided in section 654 and what constitutes a Neal test situation: A defendant lights
the outside of a building on fire. There is more than one possible statutory way to
punish the defendant for his criminal act. For example he could be punished for arson
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B.

California Penal Code Section 667. 6(c)

Section 667.6(c) of the California Penal Code specifically addresses
permissive (versus mandatory) sentencing when the crimes being
punished are sex offenses. Subdivision (c), of section 667.6, gives a
judge discretion to impose a full, separate, and consecutive term for
particular sex offense convictions such as rape, genital penetration with
a foreign object, and sodomy, among others. 13
Section 667 .6(c) is a discretionary alternative to the general consecutive sentencing formula provided by Penal Code section 1170.1. 14

and some sort of vandalism. However, under section 654, the court would only allow
one of the sentences to be invoked.
Changing the facts slightly, the defendant enters the building to light the building on
fire. He is then charged with burglary and arson. Under the Neal rule concerning
section 654, the burglary is arguably incidental to the defendant's main objective of
arson. Therefore, the defendant would not be sentenced for both the burglary and the
arson.
13. Section 667.6(c) states in pertinent part:
In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a full, separate, and consecutive
term may be imposed for each violation of Section 220, other than an assault
with intent to commit mayhem, provided that the person has been convicted
previously of violating Section 220 for an offense other than an assault with
intent to commit mayhem, paragraph (2), (3), or (7) of subdivision (a) of
Section 261, Section 264.1, subdivision (b) of Section 288, Section 288.5 or
289, of committing sodomy in violation of subdivision (k) of Section 286, of
committing oral copulation in violation of subdivision (k) of Section 288a, or
of committing sodomy or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 or 288a
by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury on the victim or another person whether or not the crimes were
committed during a single transaction.
Cal. Penal Code § 667.6(c) (West 1994) (emphasis added).
In order to properly implement section 667 .6(c), the sentencing judge must satisfy two
requirements. First, the judge must identify the criteria used to justify the use of section
667.6(c) and, second, the record must show that the court recognized that utilizing
section 667.6(c) is a separate and additional sentencing choice. People v. Belmontes, 34
Cal. 3d 335, 348, 667 P.2d 686, 693, 193 Cal. Rptr. 882, 889 (1983).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 (WEST 1994). Section 1170. l is the general
sentencing formula when multiple sentencing is involved. Section 1170. l(a) states, in
pertinent part:
.
[W]hen any person is convicted of two or more felonies . . . the aggregate
term of imprisonment for all these convictions shall be the sum of the
principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed pursuant
to [other statutes permitting additional terms]. The principal term shall consist
of the greatest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any of the
crimes. . . . The subordinate term for each consecutive offense . . . shall
consist of one-third of the middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each
other felony conviction . . . for which a consecutive term of imprisonment is
imposed. . . . In no case shall the total of subordinate terms for these
consecutive offenses . . . exceed five years.
Id.
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Therefore, section 1170.1 should briefly be discussed. Section 1170.1
pertains to sentencing when two or more felony convictions are
involved. The general formula of section 1170.1, subject to certain
exceptions, consists of a principal term, which is the greatest term of
imprisonment for any of the crimes, and subordinate terms, which are
one-third of the middle term provided for each of the additional felonies.
The subordinate terms are not to exceed five years in the aggregate. The
sum of the imprisonment sentence can not exceed twice the principle
term. 15
The following demonstrates the general formula. A defendant is
convicted of three felonies that carry terms of four, six, and eight years
respectively. Suppose the court, following section 1170.1, first imposes
a principal term of eight years, which is the largest felony sentence. To
this principal term the court would determine the middle term for the
other two felonies, which would be two and three years. One-third of
each middle term would be added to the principal term, providing a total
sentence of nine years eight· months. It is important to note that the
sentencing formula of section 1170.1 is subject to the limitations set
forth by section 654. 16 Thus, sentencing the same act twice is prohibited.11
Section 667.6(c), as noted earlier, expressly provides an
alternative to the general formula of section 1170.1. Section 667.6(c)
allows a judge to sum the full principle terms of each sex offense
irrespective of length of time that results from the summation. The
rationale behind this rule is that a criminal has a separate intent for each
sex offense committed. 18 However, the primary theme of this Note
addresses a different question: Whether punishment of non-sex offenses
not listed in section 667.6(c), which were merely incidental to committing the enumerated sex offenses, are still protected under the indivisible
transaction rule of section 654.

15. Id.§ 1170.l(g)(2).
16. Section 1170.l(a) states: "Except as provided in subdivision (c) and subject
to Section 654...." Id.§ 1170.l(a).
17. Furthermore, when invoking section 1170.1, crimes that are part of an
indivisible course of conduct or, in other words, incidental to the main objective of the
defendant's act are not subject to sentencing because of the Neal rule.
18. People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d 545, 554, 591 P.2d 63, 69, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40, 45
(1979); People v. Harrison 48 Cal. 3d 321, 336, 768 P.2d 1078, 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr.
401, 410 (1989).
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III.

STATE OF THE LAW PRIOR TO HICKS

The California Supreme Court has been moving toward a general trend
of imposing stiffer penalties for sex offenders. This most likely reflects
societal concerns of sexual abuse and sexual crimes. 19
The trend began in the California Supreme Court case of People v.
Perez. 20 Perez involved a defendant who committed a brutal sexual
attack on the victim, who was also the manager of the apartment
complex in which the defendant lived. The sexual acts included oral
copulation, sodomy, penetration with a foreign object, and rape. 21 The
defense counsel claimed that "section 654 precluded imposition of
sentence on the oral copulation and sodomy convictions because those
crimes were committed pursuant to the same intent and objective as the
rape."22 The California Supreme Court disagreed. The Perez court held
that none of the sex offenses were committed as a means of committing
any other, and none were incidental to the commission of any other.
Therefore, section 654 did not prohibit multiple punishment. 23 Perez
was handed down during the time in which section 667 .6(c) was being
discussed by the legislature, but it had not yet been codi:fied.24 Thus,
section 667 .6, because not yet enacted, was inapplicable to Perez.
In 1989, the California Supreme Court, in People v. Harrison 25 , again
without invoking section 667 .6(c)26, imposed consecutive full-term
sentences (versus the 1/3 term mid-term formula of 1170.1) for various
sex offenses committed by the defendant. 27 The court held that section

19. For commentaries regarding views toward sex offenders, see generally Andrew
Vachss, Sex Predators Can't Be Saved; They Are Incorrigible Monsters and Should Be
Locked Up Forever, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 14, 1993, at 6; Alice Vachss, Criminal Justice
System Must Stop Appeasing Rapists, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 8, 1993, at 6.
20. 23 Cal. 3d 545, 591 P.2d 63, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1979).
21. Id. at 549, 591 P.2d at 65, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 553-54, 591 P.2d at 69, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
24. Perez was handed down in March, 1979, section 667.6(c) was enacted in
September 1979. Act of Sept. 22, 1979, ch. 944, § 10, 1979 Cal. Stat. 3258.
25. 48 Cal. 3d 321, 768 P.2d 1078, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1989).
26. Section 667.6(c) was on the books at the time of the Harrison decision, but it
is not clear why the court did not use this section, or at least, explain why section
667.6(c) did not apply. The court's reasoning indicates that the court, following Perez,
found separate intents for each sexual offense. However, in essence, this is the exact
finding that section 667.6(c) codifies---the criminal defendant has a separate intent for
each sexual offense and therefore consecutive full-term sentences can be imposed. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667.6(c) (West 1994).
27. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d at 338, 768 P.2d at 1088, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12. The
sex crimes in Harrison consisted of three convictions of penetratioh of the genital
opening with a foreign object under" Penal Code section 289. The defendant went into
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654 did not prohibit imposing the consecutive full-term sentences.28
The Harrison court stated: "Since 'none of the sex offenses was
committed as a means of committing any other, none facilitated
commission of any other, and none was incidental' to any other, section
654 did not apply."29 The court's holding was based on the finding
that, even though the defendant's actions were conducted during a
continuous attack, the defendant "harbored 'multiple criminal objectives' ."30 The Harrison court, following Perez, rejected the defendant's
argument that he had a single intent and objective of obtaining sexual
gratification. 31
The California Supreme Court, addressing and interpreting section
667.6(c), decided People v. Jones. 32 The defendant in Jones forcefully ·
entered the victim's house with two other defendants, tied and ~agged
the victim's husband, and then raped and sodomized the victim. 3 The
defendants then ransacked the house and took various household items.
As a result of a plea bargain, the defendant Jones pleaded guilty to one
count of rape and robbery. 34
In Jones, the California Supreme Court made two significant findings
in regard to section 667.6(c). First, the court held that "a single
conviction of an enumerated sex offense is sufficient to trigger" the use
of section 667.6(c). 35 Second, and as the means of reaching the first
holding, the court held that the words "the crimes" in the phrase
"whether or not the crimes were committed during a single transaction"36 were not limited to the enumerated sex offenses listed in

the victim's home and, over a span of about ten minutes and while fighting strong
resistance from the victim, inserted his fingers into the victim's vagina three different
times. Id. at 325, 768 P.2d at 1079, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
28. Id. at 338, 768 P.2d at 1088, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12.
29. Id. at 336, 768 P.2d at 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 410 (quoting People v. Perez,
23 Cal. 3d 545, 553-54, 591 P.2d 63, 69, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40, 45). It is important to note
that even though the Harrison court found that section 654 did not preclude consecutive
sentences for the sex offenses, the trial court stayed the execution of a six year burglary
sentence pursuant to section 654. Id. at 326, 768 P.2d at 1080, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
30. Id. at 335, 768 P.2d at 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
31. Id.
32. 46 Cal. 3d 585, 758 P.2d 1165, 250 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988).
33. Id. at 590, 758 P.2d at 1167, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 589, 758 P.2d at 1166, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 636. For further discussion of
the Jones court's decision, see infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
36. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.6(c) (West 1994) (emphasis added).
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subdivision(c). "The crimes," the court found, extended to any crime
sufficient to trigger section 1170.1, the general sentencing statute.37
The Jones court's holding resulted in the triggering of punishment under
section 667.6(c) when only one sexual offense was committed with
another non-sex felony. 38 However, the defendant in Jones had a
separate intent for each crime he committed, making section 654
inapplicable. 39 Because the defendant had separate intents for each

37. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d at 593-94, 758 P.2d at 1169-70, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 639. The
Jones court stated:
Finally and most importantly, the assumption that the words "the crimes" in
subdivision (c) refer only to the ESO's is incorrect. Subdivision (c) starts with
the phrase "In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1" and in order to
bring section 1170.1 into play at all, the defendant must have been convicted
of multiple crimes. In our view, it is to these multiple crimes that the
language "the crimes" in the final clause of subdivision (c) must refer.
Id.
38. Id. at 600, 758 P.2d at 1174, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 643. The court stated: "We
conclude that where a defendant stands convicted of multiple felonies, subdivision (c)
vests the sentencing court with discretionary authority to impose a full, consecutive term
for any ESO conviction, even when the defendant stands convicted of only one ESO."
Id.
Justice Mosk, dissenting in Jones, makes a compelling argument by showing that the
Legislative intent behind section 667.6(c) was that the statute should only take effect
when more than one enumerated sex offense is involved. He points out that every other
section of the statute only takes effect when multiple enumerated sex offenses are
involved. Id. at 604; 758 P.2d at 1176-77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47. He stated: "In
determining [Legislative] intent, we must view each part of a statute in the context of
the whole statute and its purpose." Id. (citing People v. Black, 32 Cal. 3d 1, 5, 648 P.2d
104, 106, 184 Cal. Rptr. 454, 456 (1982)). Justice Mosk concluded that because the
other sections only applied to multiple sex offense situations and because no exception
to this was stated in subdivision (c), subdivision (c) is only triggered when more than
one enumerated sex offense is committed. Id. at 604-05, 758 P.2d at 1177, 250 Cal.
Rptr. at 64 7.
.· .
This author strongly disagrees with the Jones court's interpretation of section
667 .6(c)---especially that the words "the crimes" extend beyond enumerated sex offenses.
Disagreement w~th "the crimes" holding leads to the author's disagreement with the
holding that only one sex offense is needed to trigger section 667 .6(c), that is, the Jones
court reliance on its "crimes" interpretation to reach this holding.
Because this Note is purported to be an analysis of the Hicks decision, I am reluctant
to enter into an in-depth analysis of the Jones decision for fear of losing focus of the
paper for the reader. However, Jones does need to be discussed to some extent because
it is directly related and interwoven with the theme of the Hicks decision. Moreover,
it further exemplifies the California Supreme Court's disingenuous attitude toward this
issue and its abuse of the statutory interpretation rules. A further discussion of Jones can
be found in Part V(A).
39. In Jones, the defendant first committed the violent sex crimes and then
subsequently stole items from the victims house. Jones, 46 Cal: 3d at 589-90, 758 P.2d
at 1166, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 636. The defendant did not commit the sex crimes to
facilitate his robbery.
The Jones court, later in its opinion, infers that their holding applied to separate intent
crimes by providing a hypothetical jn which their holding would be applicable:
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crime, the court never had to address the issue as to what the section
667.6(c) language "whether or not the crimes were committed during a
single transaction" meant-the precise issue in Hicks.
In summation, in Perez, Harrison, and Jones the defendants had
separate intents for their crimes, making section 654 inapplicable. The
differences between the way the cases were decided is most likely a
result of the how the prosecution decided to argue the case and how the
defense counsel defended the case.
The California Courts of Appeal have been in conflict as to whether
section 654 is applicable to the sentencing scheme under section 667 .6(c)
when both sex and non-sex offenses are involved.40 The California
Supreme Court decided to review the Hicks appellate court decision to
resolve this conflict.

IV.

THE HICKS

DECISION

The defendant, Eric Tomont Hicks, entered a bakery at approximately
three a.m. where the victim was working alone. The door was closed
but unlocked. Hicks, after determining the victim was alone, grabbed
her and pushed her into the bathroom. He raped her six times,
committed two acts of sodomy, and on two separate occasions inserted
his fingers into her vagina. Hicks then ordered her to clean both of

A burglar breaks into a residence, assuming it to be unoccupied and -intending
only to steal some items inside, when he comes upon a woman who is
unarmed and alone. The burglar recognizes an opportunity to take advantage
of the circumstances and commits a 'convenient,' additional offense involving
a separately formed criminal intent-forcible rape, sodomy or oral copulation.
Id. at 598, 758 P.2d at 1173, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 642 (emphasis added). The court never
addressed the issue of whether section 654 should apply.
Even though the Jones holding was limited to crimes where the defendant had a
separate intent to commit each crime, the Jones case, as the discussion of Hicks in Part
V points out, makes for an easy extension to create an exception to section 654 for all
of the crimes in a sex offense situation, regardless of whether they are sex offenses listed
in section 667.6(c).
40. Compare People v. Masten, 137 Cal. App. 3d 579, 589, 187 Cal. Rptr. 515,
522 (1982) (consecutive sentences for kidnapping and rape violated the proscription
against multiple punishment under section 654), disapproved on other grounds, People
v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d 585, 600, 758 P.2d 1165, 1174, 250 Cal. Rptr. 635, 643 (1988) with
People v. Andrus, 226 Cal. App. 3d 73, 78-79, 276 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33 (1990) (defendant
could be consecutively sentenced for sex crimes and kidnapping even though kidnapping
was committed for purpose of committing the sex crimes).
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them, and they then dressed. He then told her he would help her
complete her duties. The victim resumed working until two men entered
the bakery to deliver newspapers. At this time the victim asked Hicks
to leave and he did as she asked. She locked the door and called her
supervisor to report that she had been raped. 41
Hicks was convicted of two counts of forcible sodomy42, six counts
of rape43 , two counts of genital penetration by a foreign object44 , and
one count of burglary.45 The total sentence amounted to 83 years---3
years of which were for the burglary conviction.46
The sole issue that was addressed by the California Supreme Court
was "whether imposition of sentence on the burglary count constitutes
an impermissible multiple punishment" under section 654.47 More
specifically, the court had to decide whether section 667.6(c) created an
implicit exception to the "indivisible" or "single" transaction doctrine
judicially engrafted by the court when interpreting section 654. 48

41. People v. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th 784, 788, 863 P.2d 714, 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469,
471.
Hicks is factually different from Jones (see supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text)
in that the defendant's sole purpose for entering the bakery, which resulted in a burglary,
was to commit forced sexual acts on the defendant. Entering the bakery is arguably part
of an indivisible course of conduct--the conduct being sexual assault. In Jones, the
defendant raped the victim and then went and ransacked and robbed the house where the
rape occurred. The defendant did not commit rape to achieve the purpose of committing
robbery or vice-versa.
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 286(c) (West 1993).
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(2) (West 1986). At the time of Hick's rape
conviction, section 261(2) defined rape as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished
with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances
(2) Where it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence, or fear
of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another." Id. The statute has
been since amended and the relevant provision is now section 262(a)(l). The amended
section includes in the rape definition acts of intercourse accomplished by duress or
menace. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26l(A)(l) (West Supp. 1995).
44. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 289(a) (West 1993).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (WEST 1993). The specific charge was "burglary
with the intent to commit rape, sodomy, or penetration by a foreign object." People v.
Hicks, 18 Cal. App. 4th 88, 100, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166, 173 (1992) (subsequently
depublished).
46. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 787, 863 P.2d at 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.
47. Id. at 788, 863 P.2d at 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. Hicks did not appeal the
sentences for his sex offense convictions. He only was appealing the burglary sentence.
Hicks probably did not appeal the sex offenses because, as the Hicks court noted, the
California Supreme Court had previously held that section 654 "does not prohibit the
imposition of multiple punishment for separate sexual offenses committed during a
continuous attack." Id. at n.4 (citing People v. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d 321, 336, 768 P. 2d
1078, 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401, 410 (1989)).
48. Id. at 789, 863 P.2d at 717, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472.
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The procedural posture of the case should be noted. After the trial
court convicted and sentenced Hicks on all counts, the Court of Appeal
reversed the burglary sentence.49 On appeal, Hicks argued that the
three year burglary term violated section 654 "because the burglary was
incidental to the forcible sexual offenses for which he also was
punished."50 The appellate court, following California precedent,51
concluded that the burglary count violated section 654's prohibition
against multiple punishment. 52 The California Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal and in an opinion by Justice George,
concluded that section 667 .6 "created an exception to section 654 so as
to permit the imposition of consecutive full-term sentences for enumerated offenses constituting separate acts committed during an 'indivisible'
or 'single' transaction." 53
A.

The Majority Opinion 54

Justice George began his discussion with an explanation of the scope
of section 654. He explained that the literal meaning of section 654
only prohibits multiple punishment arising out of the same act or
omission. 55 He then acknowledged that the section has been extended
to cases involving several offenses "committed during a 'course of
conduct deemed to be indivisible in time. "'56 In determining whether
a course of conduct is indivisible, Justice George, quoting a previous
California Supreme Court decision, stated:
It is defendant's intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses,
which determine whether the transaction is indivisible .... If all of the offenses

49. Id. at 787, 863 P.2d at 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.
50. Id. at 788, 863 P.2d at 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. See supra notes 9-12 and
accompanying text for further discussion on the incidental objective/indivisible course
of conduct principle.
51. The Court of Appeal followed the California Appellate decision in People v.
Masten, 137 Cal. App. 3d 579, 589, 187 Cal. Rptr. 515, 522 (1982), disapproved on
other grounds, People v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d 585, 600, 758 P.2d 1165, 1174, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 635, 643 (1988).
52. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 787, 863 P.2d at 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.
53. Id. at 786, 863 P.2d at 715, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470.
54. The Hicks majority consisted of Justice George writing the opinion, Chief
Justice Lucas, and Justices Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, and Baxter. Id. at 797, 863 P.2d
at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477.
55. Id. at 789, 863 P.2d at 716, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.
56. Id. at 789, 863 P.2d at 717, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472.
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were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating
one objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and
therefore may be punished only once. 57

Applying the interpretation of section 654, Justice George conceded that
Hicks "entered the bakery with the single criminal objective of sexually
assaulting the victim. " 58 Therefore, as Justice George found, if section
654 was applicable, Hick's could not be punished for both the burglary
and the sexual offense convictions. 59
Justice George framed the issue for the court: "We must determine,
therefore, whether section 654 prohibits such multiple punishment when
a trial court imposes consecutive full-term sentences for the enumerated
sexual offenses under the authority of section 667 .6, subdivision
(c) ... _,,60
Justice George, after explaining why a previous California Supreme
Court case did not address this issue,61 next proceeded with an interpretation of section 667 .6(c) to determine whether the legislature intended
to create an exception to section 654, which would result in allowing the
imposition of the burglary sentence.
The statutory analysis began with the literal meaning of the words
used in section 667.6(c). Because section 667.6(c) does not expressly
refer to section 654, Justice George found it necessary to determine
whether the statute's phrase "whether or not the crimes were committed
during a single transaction',62 referred to section 654's ban on multiple
punishment for acts committed during an indivisible course of con-

57. Id. at 789, 863 P.2d at 717, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472 (citing and quoting People
v. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d 321, 335, 768 P.2d 1078, 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401, 409 (1989)).
58. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 789, 863 P.Zd at 717, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. In this portion of his opinion, Justice George discussed the decision of People
v. Sileo, 45 Cal. 3d 820, 755 P.2d 294, 248 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1988). Referring to Siko,
Justice George stated that the court in that case concluded,
[w]hatever the Legislature's intent may have been with respect to the "single"
or "indivisible transaction" rule, it is clear to us it did not intend by its
enactment of [section 667.6(c)] to repeal or amend the prohibition of double
punishment for multiple violations of the Penal Code based on the "same act
or omission."
Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 791, 863 P.2d at 718, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 (quoting People v.
Siko, 45 Cal. 3d 820, 826, 755 P.2d 294, 297, 248 Cal. Rptr. 110, 113-14. Justice
George concluded that the issue in Hicks was expressly left unresolved in Siko. Id. The
court did not address this question in Siko because, in Siko, the prosecution "[did] not
seek to punish three acts once each; they [sought] to punish the same two acts twice"
and this violates section 654. Id. at 791, 863 P.2d at 718, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473
(alteration in original).
62. Id.

296

[VOL. 32: 285, 1995]

People v. Hicks
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

duct. 63 If the phrase did refer to section 654's prohibition, Justice
George found it necessary to determine "whether the use of this phrase
expresses a legislative intent to create an exception to section 654."64
Justice George concluded that "the only reasonable interpretation of
section 667.6(c)" is that it creates an exception to section 654's
prohibition of multiple punishments.65
In reaching his conclusion, Justice George made two principal
arguments. First, in a brief excerpt, he compared the language of section
667 .6 to that of section 1170.1.66 He stated that section 1170.1 is
expressly subject to section 654 whereas section 667 .6(c) is not
expressly limited by section 654. 67 Justice George found the lack of
reference to section 654 a significant difference that implied that the
legislature intended section 667 .6 to create an exception to section
654. 68
Second, Justice George analyzed legislative history of section 667 .6
to argue that the legislature intended to create an exception to section
654. He first noted that the original version of section 667 .6(c) in the
Senate Bill,69 in regard to mandating consecutive full-term sentences,
included the phrase, "whether or not the crimes were committed with a
single intent or objective or during a single transaction."70 He then
pointed out that the Senate Committee on Judiciary concluded that the
language, as initially proposed, "would mandate, in apparent disregard

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 792, 863 P.2d at 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474. Later in his opinion,
Justice George addresses the legal principle that holds if two reasonable interpretations
can be drawn from a criminal statute, the interpretation that is most favorable to the
defendant should prevail. Seemingly, he was trying to rebut this argument before even
addressing it by invoking his "only reasonable interpretation" language.
66. Id. For further discussion of section 1170.1, see supra notes 14-16 and
accompanying text.
67. Id. Section 1170.1 includes the express limitation, "subject to Section 654."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.l(a) (West 1994). In contrast, section 667.6(c) contains no
such language.
68. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 792, 863 P.2d at 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474. However,
a directly opposite conclusion than that of Justice George could be implied. See infra
notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
69. S. 13, 1979-80 Cal. Reg. Sess. § 10 (1979).
70. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 792-93, 863 P.2d at 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474 (emphasis
added).

297

of Section 654, multiple punishment for sexual offenses."71
After
explaining that the final version of section 667 .6(c) eliminated the
"single intent or objective" language, Justice George argued that if the
legislature wanted section 654 to remain applicable in section 667.6(c)'s
context, the legislature would have also deleted the language in 667 .6(c)
that refers to crimes that "were committed during a single transaction. " 72 Justice George concluded that the only reasonable explanation
for not eliminating the "single transaction" language was that "the
Legislature intended to create an exception to section 654 that would
allow multiple punishment for separate criminal acts committed during
an indivisible course of conduct."73
Much of the remainder of the majority opinion consisted of arguments
rebutting the defendant's, 74 dissent's,75 and appellate court's arguments. After briefly addressing and disposing of the defendant's
argument,76
Justice George addressed Justice Mosk's dissenting
argument. The main premise of Justice Mosk's dissent, as Justice
George viewed it, was that the language used in section 667 .6(c) was

71. Id. at 792, 863 P.2d at 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474 (emphasis in original)
(citing and quoting SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF s. 13, 1979-80 Cal.
Reg. Sess. at 8 (as amended Mar. 5, 1979)).
72. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 793, 863 P.2d at 720, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475. Justice
George stated:
Had the Legislature wished to ensure that the provisions of section 654 would
remain applicable so as to bar multiple punishment for separate criminal acts
committed during an indivisible course of conduct, it presumably would have
deleted not only the reference to offenses committed "with a single intent or
objective," but also the remainder of the phrase that refers to crimes
"committed during a single transaction."
Id.
73. Id. Again, Justice George refers to his interpretation as the only reasonable
interpretation. This is probably an attempt 'to counter the argument as discussed supra
note 65.
74. The defendant's argument, which the majority discarded rather quickly, was
that the legislature retained the language, "whether or not the crimes were committed
during a single transaction" in section 667.6(c) to clarify that they were rejecting an
approach in the original version of the bill. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 793, 863 P.2d at 720,
25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475. The approach in the original version mandated consecutive fullterm sentences for each violation of Penal Code section 288, lewd conduct with a child,
"unless such violation is committed upon one victim at the same proximate time and
place as part of and in immediate conjunction with any other violation of [section 288]
upon such victim for which the term is imposed." Id. (alteration in original) (citing and
quoting S. 13, 1979-80 Reg. Sess. § 7, as introduced Dec. 4, 1978). The majority
rejected the defendant's argument by stating: "Defendant does not explain why the
Legislature would need 'to clarify' that it had rejected a particular approach, when the
specific language that would have enacted such an approach previously had been deleted
from the bill." Id.
75. Justice Mosk was the only dissenting judge in the Hicks opinion. Id. at 784,
863 P.2d at 715, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470.
76. See supra note 74.
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used to distinguish that subsection from another subsection of the statute,
section 667.6(d). 77 The majority found that following the dissent's
interpretation, the language in question, "whether or not the crimes were
committed during a single transaction", would be mere surplusage.
Justice George concluded: "Such statutory construction is to be
avoided." 78
Justice George next addressed the Court of Appeal's argument, which
Justice George apparently found most persuasive of the three arguments.79 The Court of Appeal's argument was based on the enactment
of another Penal Code section--section 667.8. 80 Section 667.8 imposes
an additional term of punishment if the defendant kidnapped his or her
victim for the purpose of committing the sexual offense. 81 The Court
of Appeal observed that section 667 .8 was enacted after the appellate
court decision in People v. Masten, 82 which held that consecutive
sentences could not be imposed for kidnapping and rape convictions
when the offenses were part of an indivisible course of conduct. 83 The
Court of Appeal deemed it significant that the legislature enacted a new
section to cover the kidnapping/rape situation rather than merely
amending section 667.6(c) to "make clear that full, separate and
consecutive terms could be imposed" under section 667.6(c). 84
Justice George disagreed with the Court of Appeal's arguments and
conclusion for two reasons. First, he believed that the legislature, by

77. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 794, 863 P.2d at ?20, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475. The main
difference between the two subdivisions is that subdivision (c) is discretionary whereas
subdivision (d) requires full-term consecutive sentencing "if the crimes involve separate
victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions." Id. For further discussion
of Justice Mosk's argument, see infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
78. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 794, 863 P.2d at 720, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475.
79. Justice George stated: "We acknowledge that a rational argument can be made
for the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal in the present case...." Id. at 795,
863 P.2d at 721, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476.
80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.8 (West 1993).
81. Section 667.8(a) states, "Except as provided in subdivision (b), any person
convicted of a felony violation of Section 261, 264.1, 286, 288a, or 289 who, for the
purpose of committing that sexual offense, kidnapped the victim in violation of Section
207, shall be punished by an additional term of three years." Id.
82. 137 Cal. App. 3d 579, 187 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1982) disapproved on other
grounds, People v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d 585, 600, 758 P.2d 1165, 1174, 250 Cal. Rptr. 635,
643 (1988).
83. Id. at 589, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
84. People v. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th 784, 794, 863 P.2d 714, 721, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469,
476 (1993).
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enacting Penal Code section 667 .8, a mandatory sentencing statute,
achieved a different result than if it were to amend section 667.6(c), a
discretionary sentencing statute. Because the new section contained
mandatory sentencing rather than discretionary sentencing, Justice
George argued, the legislature could not have achieved its goal by only
amending section 667.6(c). 85 Second, Justice George noted that section
667.8 applies to some sex offenses not covered by section 667.6(c).
Based on these two observations, he concluded that the enactment of
section 667.8 does not support the argument that section 654 prohibits
"the imposition of consecutive full-term sentences under section 667 .6(c)
for separate offenses committed during an indivisible transaction."86
In concluding his analysis of the appellate court's rationale, Justice
George conceded that in a case where two reasonable interpretations of
a statute could be determined, the interpretation most favorable to the
defendant should be invoked. 87 However, he found that section
667 .6(c) had only one reasonable interpretation. He stated that
interpreting section 667.6(c) as subject to section 654 "would leave
entirely without meaning the language in section 667.6(c) allowing
consecutive sentences 'whether or not the crimes were committed during
a single transaction. "'88
Justice George concluded his opinion with a culpability argument to
justify that the majority's "interpretation of section 667.6(c) produces a
just result in the present case."89 Justice George explained that the
statute was implemented so as to allow sentencing enhancement for
sexual offenders who committed multiple offenses. He stated that the

85. Id. at 795, 863 P.2d at 721, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476. Justice George stated:
"Thus, the additional tenn mandated by section 667.8 must be imposed even if the trial
court declines to impose consecutive sentences or elects instead to impose standard
consecutive sentences under section 1170.1 rather than the consecutive full-term
sentences authorized under section 667.6(c)." Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 795-96, 863 P.2d at 721, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476.
88. Id. at 796, 863 P.2d. at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477. Justice George, in
arguing that the language of section 667.6(c) would be without meaning, stated the
general rule that "a statute should not be given a construction that results in rendering
one of its provisions nugatory." Id. (citing and quoting People v. Craft, 41 Cal. 3d 554,
560, 715 P.2d 585, 588, 224 Cal. Rptr. 626, 629 (1984)).
Justice George also argued that a contrary interpretation would contradict the
California Supreme Court's holding in Jones. People v. Jones, 46 Cal.3d 585, 758 P.2d
1165, 250 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1988). See supra note 51. Justice George noted that the
appellate court's interpretation would limit multiple punishment to the sex offenses
enumerated in section 667.6(c). He concluded that this interpretation is directly contrary
to the Jones holding that the phrase "the crimes" in section 667.6(c) includes both sex
and non-sex offenses. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 796, 863 P.2d at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477
n.9.
89. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 796, 863 P.2d at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
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statute's increased penalties were based on the rationale that "a
defendant who commits 'a number of base criminal acts on his victim
is substantially more culpable than a defendant who commits only one
such act. "'_90 Applying this principle to the present case, Justice George
argued that Hick's burglary, the act of entering the bakery, "aggravated
the crime by increasing the victim's vulnerability and decreasing her
chance of escape."91 Therefore, as the argument concluded, increased
punishment for the burglary was appropriate.

B.

The Dissent

Justice Mosk, the lone dissenter, began his opinion by flatly rejecting
the majority's opinion and stating: "In my view, Penal Code section 654
bars imposition of a full, consecutive term of imprisonment for
defendant's burglary conviction."92 Mosk first criticized the majority's
use of the canons of statutory construction. 93 He was appalled by the
prosecution's eagerness and the court's willingness to impose an
additional sentence for the burglary conviction, when the sentence would
never be served as a result of Hick's age. 94
·
90. Id. (citing and quoting People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d 545, 553, 591 P.2d 63, 68,
153 Cal. Rptr. 40, 44 (1979); People v. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th 1203, 1211, 858 P. 2d 611,
616, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 144, 149 (1993)). Ironically, even though the court cited Latimer
for holding the proposition that a defendant who commits multiple acts on his victim is
more culpable, the California Supreme Court in Latimer did not allow punishment of a
kidnapping offense that was only to facilitate the defendant's rape of his victim in that
case. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1216, 858 P.2d at 620, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153. For further
discussion of the Latimer decision, see infra notes 133-46 and accompanying text.
91. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 796-97, 863 P.2d at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477.
92. Id. at 797, 863 P.2d at 723, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478.
93. Id. Justice Mosk stated: "The majority reach a contrary conclusion because
they fail to apply standard canons of statutory construction. The result is the addition
of three years to an absurd sentence of eighty years in prison." Id.
· 94. Id. Justice Mosk stated: "A sentence like the one imposed here, that cannot
possibly be completed in the defendant's lifetime, makes a mockery of the law and
amounts to cruel or unusual punishment." Id. He continued:
[T]here is something unseemly in the eagerness of the People to argue that an
ambiguous expression of the Legislature be interpreted to provide for the
absolute maximum punishment, when defendant already stands sentenced to
a term he will never live long enough to complete. Furthermore, I fail to
understand the willingness of the majority of this court to twist the canons of
statutory construction to assure that defendant's ghost serves an additional
three years in confinement. . . . There is a point at which enough is enough.
Id. at 797-98, 863 P.2d at 723, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478. Justice Mosk makes a very
viable point in the commentary above. Arguably, the court viewed this case as a perfect
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Justice Mosk then turned to the meaning of the statute itself. He
reasoned that to infer that the language of section 667.6(c) created an
exception to section 654 would make the term "single transaction" mere
surplusage which should be avoided in interpreting statutes. 95 He based
this conclusion on the fact that case law preceding the enactment of
section 667 .6 had held that punishment of multiple sex offenses such as
those listed in section 667.6 had not been subject to the limitations of
section 654. 96 He explained that the reasoning behind the holdings was
that the "defendant is considered to have multiple criminal objectives
when he commits multiple sex offenses during a single attack. " 97 In
other words, Justice Mosk was implying that section 667.6(c) codified
the principle that each sex offense committed contains a separate intent,
therefore rendering section 654 inapplicable to the sentencing of these
sex offenses-not that an exception to section 654 was being created.
Justice Mosk then provided his view as to what the term "single
transaction" means. Referring to legislative history, he interpreted the
language in issue as a description of the type of punishments for sex
offenses which are permissible, or discretionary, as compared to those
which are mandatory under section 667.6(d). 98 He explained that the
original provisions of section 667 .6(c) "required mandatory full

opportunity to continue its extension in the area of increased punishment for sex
offenders. The court, probably realizing that this case would be viewed as somewhat
irrelevant and unemotional because of an insignificant three year sentence in issue, knew
they could rationalize their holding with little resistance from the legislature. However,
the Hicks decision will create anomalous applications in the future. See infra notes 15051 and accompanying text.
95. Id. at 798, 863 P.2d at 723, 255 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478.
96. Id. (citing People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d at 545, 553-54, 591 P.2d 63, 69, 153
Cal. Rptr. 40, 45 (1979); People v. Hicks, 63 Cal. 2d 764, 766, 408 P.2d 747, 749, 48
Cal. Rptr. 139, 141 (1965); People v. Harrison 48 Cal. 3d 321, 335-38, 768 P.2d 1078,
1086-88, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401, 409-11 (1989)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 799, 863 P.2d at 724, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479. Section 667.6(d), in
pertinent part, states:
A full, separate, and consecutive term shall be served for each violation of
Section 220, other than an assault with intent to commit mayhem, provided
that the person has been convicted previously of violating Section 220 for an
offense other than an assault with intent to commit mayhem, paragraph (2),
(3), or (7) of subdivision (a) of Section 261, Section 264.1, subdivision (b) of
Section 288, Section 289, of committing sodomy in violation of subdivision
(k) of Section 286, of committing oral copulation in violation of subdivision
(k) of section 288(a), or of committing sodomy or oral copulation in violation
of Section 286 or 288a by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person if the
crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate
occasions.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(d) (West 1994) (emphasis added).
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consecutive sentences, providing for discretion in sentencing only when
the offenses were part of a single attack."99 He then pointed out that
the original version of the statute was amended to provide that consecutive full-term sentencing was mandatory with no exceptions. 100 He
noted that this was the point in the statute's creation at which the
majority began its analysis. 101 Noting that the legislature was in
conflict as to whether the consecutive sentences should be mandatory or
discretionary, the following compromise ensued: "[T]he phrase 'single
intent and objective' was deleted... , subdivision (c) ... was amended
to be permissive, and subdivision (d) was added to specify under what
conditions full consecutive sentences would be mandatory." 102 Justice
Mosk, viewed the changes in the statute during its adoption process to
depict the "Legislature's struggle to define when the sentencing court
retains discretion whether to impose full, consecutive sentences, but not
any intent to confront the separate and largely irrelevant problem of
section 654." 103
Justice Mosk concluded his opinion by arguing that at the bare
minimum, section 667.6 is ambiguous on whether section 654 applies.
He noted the conflicts in the lower courts as to the interpretation of
section 667.6(c). 104 These conflicts, he argued, did not lead to the
majority's conclusion that the only reasonable interpretation of section
667 .6(c) is that it creates an exception to section 654. He reiterated that
the legislature, when enacting the statute, had no need to be concerned
with section 654 's prohibitions in regard to forcible sex offenses. 105
In concluding that there is more thaq. one reasonable interpretation to
section 667.6(c), Justice Mosk stated: "Accordingly, we should adhere

99. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 799, 863 P.2d at 724, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479 (emphasis
in original) (citing S. 13, 1979-80 Cal. Reg. Sess., § 7, at 7 (as introduced Dec. 4,
1978)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 799-800, 863 P.2d at 724, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479.
104. Id. at 800, 863 P.2d at 724, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479 (citing People v. Andrus,
226 Cal. App. 3d 73, 78-79, 276 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32-33 (1990); People v. Anderson, 221
Cal. App. 3d 331, 339-43, 270 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521-24 (1990); People v. Masten 137 Cal.
App. 3d 579, 589, 187 Cal. Rptr. 515, 522-23 (1982)).
105. Id.
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to the basic principle of construction that ambiguity in a penal statute
should be interpreted in favor of the defendant." 106
V.

ANALYSIS OF HICKS

Through the use of Eric Tomont Hicks and some very questionable,
disingenuous statutory interpretation, the California Supreme Court has
nearly completed its quest to eliminate the protection of section 654 with
respect to multiple sex offense cases.
A.

The Jones-Hicks Dilemma

As previously discussed, the California Supreme Court in Jones
interpreted the words "the crimes" to apply to more than just those
enumerated sex offenses expressly stated in section 667 .6(c). 107 This
interpretation would appear to reach the exact same result that the
California Supreme Court was eager to reach in Hicks~onsecutive fullterm sentences may be uninhibitedly imposed under section 667.6(c) if
at least one of the crimes is a sexual offense listed in section 667 .6(c).
After all, the Jones court basically stated that a consecutive full-term
sentence could be imposed for each enumerated sex offense conviction
along with a full-term non-sex offense sentence. This gives the same
result as Hicks, with the only difference being that Hicks involved more
full-term sex offense sentences that could be added to the full term nonsex offense sentence. Therefore, if both cases have essentially the same
holding, why was the Hicks decision necessary?
The answer to this question must be that the Jones court did not even
contemplate a Hicks type situation, a situation involving a conflict with
section 654, when interpret1ng section 667.6(c). Arguably, the Jones
court's holding could be read such 'that consecutive full-term sentences
can be imposed for multiple offenses, even if only one conviction is a
section 667.6(c) sex offense, only if the non-sex offenses involved a
separate intent and objective. 108 This interpretation of the Jones

106. Id. at 800, 863 P.2d at 724, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479 (citing People v. Davis,
29 Cal. 3d 814,828,633 P.2d 186, 193, 176 Cal. Rptr. 521,529 (1981)).
107. People v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d 585, 593-94, 758 P.2d 1165, 1169-70, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 635, 639. The Jones majority stated: "[W]e believe the words 'the crimes' in
subdivision (c) were meant to refer to the multiple sex or nonsex felonies otherwise
required to bring section 1170.1 into play, not just multiple ESO's." Id. at 597, 758 P.2d
at 1171, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 641 (emphasis added). For a discussion of Jones, see supra
notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
108. As previously mentioned, the defendant in Jones did have a separate intent for
both the robbery and the rape offenses for which he was sentenced. See supra note 39
and accompanying text.
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holding is supported by language in the opinion. The Jones court stated:
"[T]he court may discretionarily impose a full, consecutive sentence for
each ESQ conviction, irrespective of whether the violent sex crime and
the other crime making section 1170.1 fotentially applicable were
committed 'during a single transaction. "' 10 Section 1170.1 is expressly limited by section 654. Therefore, in order for multiple crimes to
make section 1170.1 "potentially applicable," a separate intent and
objective would be needed for each crime. This reasoning indicates that
the Jones court based its holding on the assumption that the language of
section 667.6(c), "whether or not the crimes were committed during a
single transaction" meant something other than the Hicks indivisible
transaction interpretation. However, the Jones court never provided a
meaning for "indivisible transaction."
Arguably, the Jones court did not even contemplate a situation where
the non-sex offense was merely incidental to the sex offense. 110 The
court never mentioned section 654 or what might result if section 654
would apply. Also, the hypothetical fact scenario given by the court to
support its position involved crimes with separate intents. m

B.

The Hicks Opinion Analysis

As noted in Part IV the Hicks court primarily uses two means in
reaching its purpose: 1) a textual interpretation incorporating legislative
history and, 2) a culpability argument. These two means will be
discussed below. Also, an analysis of the Hicks opinion in light of
conflicting precedent and other penal code legislation not addressed in
the opinion itself will be presented.

1.

Statutory Interpretation

The statutory interpretation of section 667 .6(c) conducted by the Hicks
majority primarily took the form of two arguments. First, the majority

109. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d at 594, 758 P.2d at 1170, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (emphasis
added).
110. Arguably, the court's finding that "the crimes" extended beyond those listed
in section 667.6(c) is mere dicta. It was not the essential holding of the case. If the
Jones court did contemplate a Hicks type of situation, they may have not discussed the
issue because it could possibly interfere with the court's desired holding by having to
refute the limitations of section 654.
111. See supra note 39.
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compared the language of section 667 .6(c) to that of section 1170.1, the
statute expressly limited by section 654. The majority found it important
that section 1170.1 contained the language, "subject to section 654"
whereas section 667 .6(c) contained no such language.11 2
This
argument, though persuasive, is tenuous-----especially in light of the fact
that section 667.6(c) does refer to section 1170.1 and section 1170.1
refers to section 654. Section 667.6(c) specifically references the
sentencing formula provided in section 1170.1 by stating: "In lieu of the
term provided in Section 1170.1 ...." 113 This alternative formula in
section 667.6(c) is still subject to the same iimitations of the formula of
section 1170.1, namely section 654. Section 667.6(c) is only replacing
the method of summing the terms for the crimes rather than replacing
the theme of the sentencing statute--sentences subject to multiple
punishment.
Furthermore, section 1170.1 specifically references section 667 .6.
Section 1170.1, regarding 667 .6, states, in pertinent part, "subject to
Section 654, when any person is convicted of two or more felonies . . .
the aggregate term of imprisonment for all these convictions shall be the
sum of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term
imposed pursuant to Section ... 667.6 .... " 114 This language of
section 1170.1 arguably implicates a legislative intent to make 667 .6(c)
susceptible to section 654.
Second, the majority looked to the legislative history to determine if
section 667.6(c) created an exception to section 654. The Hicks majority
stated: "The Legislature's reason for deleting from section 667.6(c) the
[languange 'single intent or objective' from] the phrase 'whether or not
the crimes were committed with a single intent or objective or during a
single transaction' is not apparent." 115
However, the reason may be more apparent than the Hicks majority
would like to admit. The California Supreme Court in Neal initially
framed the section 654 extended interpretation issue as follows:
"Whether a course of criminal c<;mduct is divisible and therefore gives
rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on
the intent and objective of the actor." 116 Arguably, when the legislature, in its original provisions of section 667.6(c), used the "intent or
112. People v. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th 784, 792, 863 P.2d 714, 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469,
474 (1993).
113. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.6(c) (West 1994) (emphasis added).
114. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1170.l(a) (West 1993).
115. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 793, 863 P.2d at 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474 (emphasis
added).
.
116. Neal v. California, 55 Cal. 2d l l, 19, 357 P.2d 839, 843, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 61 l
(1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 823 (1961).
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objective" language, it was precisely referring to the "indivisible course
of conduct" test set forth in Neal and intended to create an exception to
this rule. The legislature, in subsequent statutory revisions, could very
well have been purposely not creating an exception to section 654 by
removing the "intent or objective" language from the statute. The
legislature most likely removed the phrase "single intent or objective"
because it realized the phrase was useless language because the courts
had already held that in cases involving multiple sex crimes, all of the
sex crimes have separate intents. 117 Therefore, if the language remained in the statute, it would be suggesting that some multiple sex
crime situations could involve only one intent and that these situations
would be exempt from a section 654 prohibition.
Thus, the phrase "or during a single transaction" arguably was serving
a different purpose than that of referencing section 654. By deleting the
"intent or objective" language and retaining the "single transaction"
language, the legislature effectuated its purpose: consecutive full-term
sentences could be imposed for the sexual offenses listed in section
667.6(c) regardless of whether they were committed during only one
uninterrupted transaction with the victim, because each offense has a
separate intent-not because they should be excepted from section 654
in spite of a single intent or objective.
An Assembly Committee report contemporaneous to the enactment of
section 667.6(c) also supports the conclusion that non-sex offenses were
not intended to be included in the scope of section 667.7(c). 118 The
Assembly Committee report stated: "SB 13 provides that a full separate
term shall be served for each conviction of rape, rape in concert,
sodomy, oral copulation, object rape and child molestation." 119 This
report specifically refers to the sex offenses that were listed in the
statute. Obviously, the legislature was interested in allowing sex offense

117. As previously discussed, in Perez, the California Supreme Court, held that
separate intents were involved. For discussion of the Perez decision, see supra notes 2024 and accompanying text.
118. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ANALYSIS of S. 13 (1979).
119. Id. The Hicks majority did not refer to this report, but instead referenced a
Senate Committee on the Judiciary report. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS
OF S. 13, 1979-80 Cal. Reg. Sess., at 8 (as amended Mar. 5, 1979). This report
summarized section 667.6(c) in the same manner as the Assembly Report: "This bill
would ... provide that a 'full, separate and consecutive term' would be served for each
conviction of such an offense." Id. (emphasis added). See infra notes 121-24 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the Senate Committee on Judiciary Report.
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convictions to carry consecutive full-term sentences. The report does not
mention anything regarding imposing full consecutive sentences for nonsex offenses not covered by the statute. Therefore, the intent of the
legislature regarding section 667.6(c) is more clearly depicted as a desire
to exclusively make sex offenses carry full-term consecutive sentences.
The legislative intent as to whether this statute was to apply to incidental
non-sex offenses protected under section 654 is at the very least,
questionable. 120
Another important fact, stressed by the Hicks appellate court, that
depicts the legislative intent behind section 667.6(c) was an analytical
report of the original bill by the Senate Committee on Judiciary. The
Senate Committee, in its analysis, questioned whether the author of
section 667.6(c) "intended to 'mandate, in apparent disregard of Section
654, multiple punishments for sexual offenses committed during a single
transaction. '" 121 This analysis "focused squarely on the potential
conflict between section 654's prohibition against multiple punishment
and the bill's apparent disregard of that section." 122 The legislature,
after examining the Committee's report, promptly amended the bill by
deleting the phrase "single intent or objective." 123 This course of
events further implies that the legislature was not intending to create an
exception to section 654. 124 The legislature was made aware of the

120. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, this author believes that section
667.6(c) is limited to the sexual offenses listed, not to other offenses as the Jones court
held. The legislature, in section 667.6(c) was only codifying the Perez holding, which
held that multiple sexual criminal acts on a victim involve separate intents. Perez did
not hold that non-sex offenses incidental to the sexual acts also carried separate intents
or that these non-sex offenses should be punished as an exception to section 654. The
legislature, in all likelihood, did not intend s.ection 667.6(c) to carry implications beyond
the holding of Perez.
·
121. People v. Hicks, 18 Cal. App. 4th 88, 103, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166, 175 (1992)
(subsequently depublished) (citing SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF s. 13,
1979-80 Cal. Reg. Sess., at S(as amended Mar. 5, 1979)).
122. Id. at 104, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
123. Id.
124. In the final modifications to. section 667.6(c) before being enacted, the
legislature imposed a new subdivision, section 667.6(d). This subdivision imposes
mandatory, rather than discretionary, full-term consecutive sentences "if the crimes
involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions." CAL. PENAL
CODE-§ 667.6(d) (West 1994). The phrase "separate occasions" has been defined by the
legislature as an instance where "the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect
upon his or her actions and nevertheless resumed sexually assaultive behavior." Id.
Moreover, whether the defendant "lost or abandoned his or her opportunity to attack"
is not determinative by itself. Id. This definition sounds as if it could relate to separate
intent. If it were to mean separate intent, then arguably the legislature was not
codifying, in section 667.6(c), the principle that each sex offense in a series of sex
offenses committed during a single transaction has a separate intent. However, the
phrase "separate occasions" has not been interpreted to mean separate intents. See
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conflicting interpretation it created and deleted the "single intent or
objective" in order to make clear the statute's true purpose.

2.

Culpability

The court's culpability argument was based on what it felt was the
purpose behind the enactment of section 667.6(c). The court stated:
"That statute was intended to allow enhanced punishment of certain
sexual offenders who comm.it multiple offenses. [citation omitted] Such
increased penalties are appropriate, because a defendant who comm.its 'a
number of base criminal acts on his victim. is substantially more culpable
than a defendant who comm.its only one such act." 125 Obviously, one
of the purposes behind this statute was to punish a defendant in
correlation with his culpability. One who comm.its several different
sexual acts, often very violent acts, is arguably more culpable than a
defendant who only comm.its one such act.
However, the court's culpability argument runs afoul in the present
case. In essence, the court is arguing that the burglary makes Hicks
more culpable than if he did not comm.it the burglary. Granted, Hicks
would have never been able to comm.it the sex offenses if he did not
first comm.it the burglary. However, extending this argument to other
criminal scenarios would virtually swallow the defendant-protecting
limitations set forth in section 654 case law. Following the court's
rationale, a defendant involved in a multiple crime situation not
involving sex offenses would nevertheless be punished for every single
crime com.m.itted which was incidental to the defendant's main intent and
which was part of an indivisible course of conduct, even though
punishment for these crimes would normally be prohibited by section
654. The court conceded that the burglary was incidental and was only
com.m.itted to facilitate the sexual crimes. This fact makes the culpability argument run directly contrary to the protection of section 654.

People v. Reeder, 152 Cal. App. 3d 900, 914-15, 200 Cal. Rptr. 479, 489-90 (1984)
("the test for consecutive punishment under section 667.6, subdivision (d), is not whether
a single transaction is divisible [indicating separate intent] but is rather whether the
offenses occurred on occasions disjoined from each other') (emphasis added).
Having a separate intent and having the opportunity to reflect upon one's actions are
arguably two different things. Or, put in another way, a separate act in a single
transaction (section 667.6(c)) is different from a separate occasion (section 667.6(d)).
125. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 796, 863 P.2d at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at477.
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The following example may be useful to exemplify the court's flaw.
The defendant in Neal v. California, 126 threw gasoline ori his victims
and then ignited the gasoline in an attempt to murder the victims. The
defendant was convicted on two counts of attempted murder and one
count of arson. 127 The court concluded that punishing for the arson
was not allowed due to the restrictions set forth in section 654. 128 The
arson was considered, by the Neal court, as incidental to the defendant's
main objective of murder, and therefore protected from punishment by
section 654. 129 Applying the Hicks rationale to the Neal fact scenario,
the additional act of arson infers that the defendant is more culpable and
should be punished for both crimes.
The Hicks court's culpability argument does have truth and strength
to it, but in a more limited sense. Section 667 .6(c) only lists sex
offenses for which sentence enhancements can be invoked. The
legislature, along with the precedent previously discussed, evidently
believed that a defendant who commits several of these offenses on his
victim is more culpable. However, for the legislature to believe that the
other crimes incidental to the sex offenses make the defendant more
culpable would be directly contrary to the legislature's belief and intent
behind section 654. After all, the purpose behind section 654 's
protection against multiple punishment is to "insure that a defendant's
punishment will be commensurate with his culpability."130
Arguably, a person who commits an offense, even though the crime
was part of an indivisible course of conduct in committing the _main
offense, is nonetheless more culpable than if he had never committed the
incidental crime. For example, it is difficult to grasp the concept that a
person committing bank robbery is not more culpable when he steals a
car to carry out his robbery than if he had not stolen the car. But under
the judicial extensions of section 654, the defendant might not be
sentenced for the auto theft. 131

126. 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960).
127. Id. at 15, 357 P.2d at 841, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 609.·
128. Id. at 20, 357 P.2d at 844, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
129. Id. Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, stated:
In the instant case the arson was the means of perpetrating the crime of
attempted murder. . . . The conviction for both arson and attempted murder
violated Penal Code section 654, since the arson was merely incidental to the
primary objective of killing [the victims]. Petitioner, therefore can only be
punished for the more serious offense, which is attempted murder.
Id.

130. People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d 545, 551, 591 P.2d 63, 67, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40, 43
(1979).
131. However, in this scenario, a prosecutor would probably succeed in proving a
separate intent for the auto theft--significantly easier than proving a separate intent for
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In spite of the argument above, the culpability argument regarding
section 667.6(c) is still tenuous in its application. For instance, when
invoking the majority rationale in Hicks, a person who rapes a woman
out on the street and then burglarizes a home is no more culpable than
a person who breaks into a home solely to commit a rape. Arguably, the
defendant in the former scenario is much more culpable. "[A] person's
criminal culpability requires a showing that he acted purposely,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with
respect to each material element of the offense." 132 In the former
scenario, the defendant is acting purposely as to both the rape and the
burglary. He has a specific intent and objective to rape the victim, and
he also has a specific intent and objective to burglarize a house. In the
latter scenario the person is acting purposely in regard to the rape but,
arguably, is acting less than purposely in regard to the burglary.

3.

Precedent

Just over two months before the Hicks decision was handed down, the
California Supreme Court decided People v. Latimer. 133 In Latimer,
the defendant kidnapped his victim for the purpose of taking her out to
the desert to rape her. He brutally raped her twice. The trial court
imposed sentences for both of the rapes and for the kidnapping. 134
On appeal, the California Supreme Court specifically refused to
overrule the Neal decision. 135 The court, following the Neal extension

the burglary in Hicks. The defendant, deciding he wants to rob the bank, decides he
needs a car to achieve this main purpose. Therefore, he decides he has to steal a car,
committing another crime to achieve this purpose. Even though he knows a separate
crime needs to be committed before achieving the robbery, he disjunctively decides to
steal the car. In a Hicks type fact scenario, the sex offender could be strolling by a
store, look in a window and see a woman, and walk in for the sole purpose of raping the
woman. All he knows is that he wants to rape the woman and all he has to do to
achieve this is to walk into the store with little to no thought as to whether he is
committing a crime.
132. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 379 (6th ed. 1990) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(1)).
133. 5 Cal. 4th 1203, 858 P.2d 611, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 144 (1993).
134. Id. at 1206, 858 P.2d at 613, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146. The defendant was
sentenced for six years for each rape conviction, five years for an infliction of great
bodily injury conviction, and for a consecutive term of one year, eight months for the
kidnapping conviction. The kidnapping term was one-third of the middle term that could
be imposed for kidnapping. Id.
135. Id. at 1205, 858 P.2d at 612, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145.
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of section 654, specifically held, "'Since the kidnapping was for the
purpose of committing the sexual offenses and [defendant] has been
punished for each of the sexual offenses,' section 654 bars execution of
sentence on the kidnapping count." 136 The court, even though criticizing the Neal rule, stated:
The Neal rule . . . is far more pervasive; it has influenced so much subsequent
legislation that stare decisis mandates adherence to it. It can effectively be
overruled only in a comprehensive fashion, which is beyond the ability of this
court. The remedy for any inadequacies in the current law must be left to the
Legislature. 137
.

The Latimer court held that when making decisions involving the Neal
rule, the court should be cautious in rendering decisions that conflict
with the Neal rule--the precise conflict that occurred in Hicks. The
Latimer majority stated that the rationale behind their holding was based
on the legislature's reliance on the Neal rule. 138
The court presented one instance applicable to the facts in Latimer in
which the legislature relied on the Neal rule. The court quoted Penal
Code section 667.8: "[A]ny person convicted of a felony violation of
[rape] who, for the purpose of committing that sexual offense, kidnapped
the victim in violation of Section 207, shall be punished by an additional
term of three years." 139 In other words, if the defendant kidnaps his
victim to commit one of the enumerated sex offenses listed in section
667.8, an enhancement of three years will be imposed. However, section
667 .8 was not invoked by the Latimer court because it "was neither pled
nor proven" by the prosecution. 140

136. Id. at 1216, 858 P.2d at 620, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153 (alteration in original)
(citing and quoting People v. Flores, 193 Cal. App. 3d 915, 921-22, 238 Cal. Rptr 656,
659 (1987)).
.
137. Id., 858 P.2d at 619, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153. Even though the court refused
to overrule Neal, they did clarify that the Latimer holding was not intended to limit those
cases "finding consecutive, and therefore separate, intents, and those finding different,
if simultaneous, intents." Id. at 1216, 858 P.2d at 620, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153.
138. The majority in Latimer noted that the legislature had not exactly relied on
the Neal rule but then stated: "[T]he result for present purposes is the same as if there
had been legislative reliance. The Legislature has enacted substantial legislation
reflecting its acceptance of the Neal rule." Id. at 1214, 858 P.2d at 618, 23 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 151.
In regard to Legislative reliance, the court explained: "'Stare decisis has added force
when the legislature, in the public sphere, and citizens, in the private realm, have acted
in reliance on a previous decision, for in this instance overruling the decision would
dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an extensive legislative response."'
Id. at 1213-14, 858 P.2d at 618, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151 (quoting Hilton v. South
Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991)).
139. Id. at 1215, 858 P.2d at 619, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
140. Id. Moreover, Latimer did not address section 667.6(c). Section 667.6(c) was
most likely not raised by the prosecution. For further discussion of section 667.8, see
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Latimer implicates major weaknesses in the Hicks decision. First, the
Latimer court recognized the pervasiveness of and the deference that
should be given to the Neal rule. The Hicks majority apparently
disregarded this principle in analyzing section 667 .6(c). As mentioned
earlier, the Hicks majority stated: "The Legislature's reason for deleting
from section 667.6(c) ... the phrase 'whether or not the crimes were
committed· with a single intent or objective' . . . is not apparent." 141
Even though the legislature's reasoning was "not apparent," the Hicks
majority nonetheless had little difficulty in finding that section 667 .6(c)
created an exception to section 654 and, therefore, the Neal rule. The
Hicks majority, if following the principles set, forth in their Latimer
decision, should have deferred to the Neal interpretation of section 654
and should not have found an exception created by section 667 .6(c).
Even though the Hicks court declined to find that section 667 .6(c) did
not create an exception to section 654, the Hicks court should have at
least concluded that the statute was ambiguous as to whether an
exception was created and interpreted the statute in favor of the
defendant. 142 The court, by doing this, would have been acting in an
appropriate manner by leaving the exception issue to the legislature. As
the Latimer court stated: "On a more general front, what. other statutes
and legislative decisions may have been influenced by the Neal rule, and
in what ways? These are questions the Legislature, not this court, is best
equipped to answer." 143
Second, and more specifically, the Latimer decision essentially
acknowledges the legislative relianc~ on the Neal rule in enacting

infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
141. People v. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th 784, 793, 863 P.2d 714, 719, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 469,
474 (1993).
142. "When language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used
in a penal law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will
be adopted." People v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d 585, 599, 758 P.2d 1165, 1173, 250 Cal. Rptr.
635,643 (1988) (citing People v. Davis, 29 Cal. 3d 814,828,633 P.2d 186, 193, 176
Cal. Rptr. 521, 528 (1981). The Hicks court was mindful of this interpretation but
concluded that only one reasonable interpretation existed. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 795-96,
863 P.2d at 722, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477. For a discussion of the Hicks rationale
regarding this issue, see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
143. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1216, 858 P.2d at 619, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
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statutes. 144 As mentioned above, the court points to section 667 .8 to
show the legislature's reliance. The court stated:
[T]he Legislature was apparently aware that under the prevailing interpretation
of section 654, consecutive sentences for a sexual offense and kidnapping would
be impermissible if the sole purpose of the kidnapping was to facilitate the
sexual offense. It accepted that interpretation ... and enacted the three-year
enhancement of section 667.8 to remedy the problem. 145

Arguably, the legislature had the Neal rule in mind when enacting and
reviewing the other penal code sections relating to sex offense sentencing, namely section 667.6(c). If this is the case, the legislature would
not have omitted the language "single intent or objective" of the original
version of section 667 .6(c), the explicit terminology used in the Neal
rule, if it intended to create an exception to section 654. 146

4.

California Penal Code Section 667.8

The Latimer court's reference to California Penal Code section 667 .8
brings to mind other weaknesses regarding the Hicks interpretation of
section 667 .6(c). One fl.aw in the court's interpretation of section
667 .6(c) is apparent when looking at the language used in section 667 .8.
How is it so simple for the Hicks court to find that the ambiguous
wording of section 667.6(c) creates an exception to section 654, when
the legislature, in section 667 .8, has specifically created, in clear and
concise terms, exceptions to section 654 for certain non-sex offenses
incidental to sex crimes?
The answer to this question is simple--the Hicks court incorrectly
interpreted section 667.6(c). As previously noted, Penal Code section
667.8 states, in pertinent part, "[A]ny person convicted of a felony
violation of Section 261 [rape], 264.1 [Rape/penetration by a foreign
object with force or violence], 286'[sodomy], 288a [oral copulation], or
289 [penetration by foreign object] who,for the purpose of committing
that sexual offense, kidnapped the victim in violation of Section 207,

144. The Latimer court states:
Here, the Legislature has not exactly relied on the Neal rule, since it had the
power to overrule it. It has also never expressly endorsed it. Rather, it has
essentially accepted it, perhaps out of a belief that courts are best suited to
analyze double-punishment questions. But the result for present purposes is
the same as if there had been legislative reliance.
Id. at 1214, 858 P.2d at 618, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 1215, 858 P.2d at 619, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
146. Latimer reinforces the author's argument set forth in Part V(B)(l) entitled
"Statutory Interpretation" regarding why the legislature may have deleted the phrase
"single intent or objective." See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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shall be punished by an additional term of three years." 147 The
legislature, in this statute, has referred to the Neal interpretation of
section 654 through its language "for the purpose of committing that
sexual offense" and has therefore created an exception to section
654. 148 Arguably, the legislature would have been more specific in
section 667. 6(c), possibly invoking language similar to that of section
667.8, if it actually intended to create an exception to section 654
regarding non-sex offenses. Justice George, in his Hicks opinion,
neglected to acknowledge the significant implications that section 667 .8
has on the interpretation of section 667 .6(c). 149
A second weakness is that a defendant could theoretically be sentenced
under both section 667.6(c) and section 667.8. Granted, section 654
could possibly restrict the sentencing to only one sentence being
imposed. However, following the Hicks interpretation of section
667.6(c) and the Latimer interpretation of section 667.8, both of these
sections are outside the scope of section 654. This leaves the sentencing
judge with a dilemma. When a judge is sentencing a defendant, he is
required to impose at least a three year kidnapping term under section
667 .8. If the judge, in his or her discretion, determines that a full-term
should be imposed for the kidnapping under section 667 .6(c), what
should be the total sentence? Can the judge only impose a term
equivalent to what a full-term would be minus the three year mandated
term or can the judge just add the full-term from section 667.6(c) to the
three-year term of section 667.8? 150 If the judge can only impose the

147. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667.8(a) (West 1993) (emphasis added). Subdivision (b)
of section 667.8 contains similar language but applies to children under the age of 14
who are kidnapped for the purpose of the sex offense. The sentence enhancement under
these circumstances is nine years. Id. § 667.8(b).
148. In People v. Hernandez, 46 Cal. 3d 194, 757 P.2d 1013, 249 Cal. Rptr. 850
(1988), the California Supreme Court stated: "[T]he additional term to be imposed under
section 667.8 was originally designed to eliminate the partial sentence reduction that
might be gained by application of . . . the prohibition against multiple punishment
contained in section 654 (if the kidnapping and sex offense were part of one indivisible
course of conduct)." Id. at 203, 757 P.2d at 1017, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
149. Justice George, in Hicks, does refer to section 667.8 when addressing the
appellate court's rationale in prohibiting the burglary sentence. See infra note 151.
However, he does not acknowledge that the language used in section 667.8 may indicate
an interpretation of section 667.6(c) contrary to that of the Hicks majority.
150. For example, as in the Latimer case, a defendant was charged on two counts
of rape and one count of kidnapping. He was sentenced for the upper term of eight
years on each rape count. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 264 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994). The

315

difference between the discretionary full-term and the three year
mandated term, why does section 667.6(c) not include limiting language
to this effect? Attempting to find consistent answers to these inquiries
depicts the inconsistencies of the Hicks decision. 151
VI.

EFFECTS OF HICKS

The Hicks decision has one obvious effect on the criminal justice
system: courts will be permitted to impose full, consecutive sentences on
sex offenders that never have been allowed in the past. If the general
public were surveyed as to the reaction to this result, most likely a large
percentage would be elated to see criminal sex offenders spend more
time in prison. 152
However, two other effects of Hicks are more troubling in spite of the
strong abhorrence toward sex offenders. First, as discussed in Part V,
Hicks could create several anomalous situations in the future. As
discussed above, how section 667.8, concerning kidnapping, will interact

full term of a kidnapping count also carries a sentence of eight years. See CAL. PENAL
CODE§ 208 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994). The judge, governed by sections 667.6(c) and
667.8, would have to determine which of the following sentences would be allowed:
I) Imposing an enhanced sentence of three years, according to section 667.8, with an
additional full, consecutive term, invoking section 667.6(c), but then subtracting the
enhancement, leaving a total of five years. Notice this sentencing choice runs contrary
to the language of section 667.6(c) which allows a "full, separate, and consecutive term"
because it is not a full eight-year consecutive term, but only a five-year consecutive
term.
2) Imposing a three-year enhancement under section 667.8 and imposing an eight-year
consecutive full-term under section 667.6(c). This would normally encounter section 654
limitations. However, section 654's prohibitions in this area are uncertain in light of
Hicks.
•
3) Choosing only one of the statutes and imposing that term. However, would the
judge have a choice? After all, the judge is required under section 667.8 to impose a
three-year enhancement.
The Hicks majority claimed to be hearing the case to clear up the sentencing conflicts
among the lower courts. However, as the above problem illustrates, in essence, the
court's holding and rationale have created more conflicts.
151. Justice George, in his Hicks opinion, did briefly address this dual sentencing
interpretation that may create inconsistencies. First, he stated that the court had no
opinion as to whether the legislature intended to allow cumulative sentencing by utilizing
both sections 667.6(c) and 667.8. Justice George then stated that if the legislature did
not intend to allow sentencing under both statutes, the court "[c]ould effectuate such a
legislative intent simply by holding that a defendant could not receive both a section
667.8 enhancement and consecutive full-term sentences under section 667.6(c) based
upon the same offenses." Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 795, 863 P.2d at 721, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 476 n.8. This would appear to clear up the inconsistencies by invoking section 654
to prohibit both sentencing statutes to be invoked simultaneously.
152. In 1990, the probability of a defendant receiving a prison term for a rape
conviction was only 53%. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1990, at 15 (1993).
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with section 667.6(c) is one such situation. 153 Also, on a more general
level, the section 667.8/section 667.6(c) situation is creating more
inconsistencies and confusion in the sentencing procedure the courts are
to follow-an area the criminal justice system is attempting to streamline.154 Another anomalous situation could arise where a defendant
commits multiple incidental non-sex offenses in pursuing one sex
offense, such as rape. 155 Following the Hicks decision, consecutive
full-term sentences for all of the crimes would be imposed. Multiple
sentencing in this situation may significantly diverge from the making
statutes' purposes of makings sentences commensurate with the
defendant's culpability.
A second troubling effect of the Hicks decision, the court's disregard
for established statutory rules of construction and its use of legislative
type powers, could infiltrate areas beyond the sex offender sentencing
realm. The judiciary has limits in what it can do in interpreting statutes.
A court's duty is to reasonably interpret the legislative intent in a
statute. 156 As previously discussed, if, in a penal code statute, two
reasonable interpretations can be drawn from the statute, the interpretation most favorable to the defendant should be invoked. As the prior
analysis of the Hicks decision indicates-if giving the benefit of the
doubt to the court-two reasonable interpretations can nonetheless be

153. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
154. For commentary regarding reforming sentencing laws, see generally Paul H.
Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1987).
155. Consider the following: A defendant entered the victim's house, took the
victim to the garage and put the victim in her car, and then drove off with the victim so
he could rape her. The defendant then leaves the scene by foot. Under this
hypothetical, the defendant could probably be convicted of burglary, robbery,
kidnapping, and rape. In light of Hicks, even though the burglary, robbery, and
kidnapping were all committed for the purpose of committing one sexual offense, the
rape, the defendant could nonetheless be given consecutive full-term sentences for all
three crimes, in addition to a full-term sentence for the rape.
If, on the other hand, the defendant committed the burglary, robbery, and the
kidnapping for the sole purpose of a non-sexual, physical assault, the defendant would
most likely only be sentenced for the physical assault because of section 654's
limitations.
156. "The quest for legislative intent is not unbounded: 'It still remains true, as it
always has, that there can be no intent in a statute not expressed in its words, and there
can be no intent upon the part of the framers of such a statute which does not find
expression in words."' City of Sacramento v. Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 545, 548 (1994) (citing and quoting Ex parte Goodrich, 160 Cal. 410, 416-17,
117 P. 451, 454 (1911)).
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drawn from section 667 .6(c). The court disregarded this principle to
reach its desired conclusion. This is an abuse of judicial power that, if
the court can commit without criticism, may inspire the court to carry
this abuse into other criminal statutory interpretations. If one were not
to give the· Hicks court the benefit of the doubt and conclude that the
court's interpretation is directly contrary to what the legislature intended,
the court has then stepped over the line and infringed on powers
specifically reserved for the legislature. 157 The court is replacing the
legislature's intent with its own desired interpretation. 158 This type of
action erodes the distinction between those roles reserved for the
judiciary and those reserved for the legislature.

VIL

CONCLUSION

The Hicks decision, to many, is probably seen as a step in the right
direction in the punishment of sex offenders. Many people, particularly
the victims, probably feel a sex offender can never be put away long
enough. This Note's position is not that sex offenders should never
receive increased sentences for their incidental crimes. Rather, the
statutory sentencing scheme, created by the powers vested in the
legislature, should be adhered to by the court, rather than deviated from
to create a scheme that the court deems fit. In other words, the
legislature should make the decision to increase sentences, or, more
specifically, to create an exception to section 654 via section 667 .6(c).
The Hicks court abused its powers and created precedent for a future
wave of longer sentences in criminal sex offense cases. 159 Hicks was
the perfect case for the California Supreme Court with which to make
the transition. After all, Eric Tomont Hicks already had an uncontested
eighty year sentence to serve. The three year burglary sentence was
basically insignificant when compared with the full sentence. The only

157. The California Code of Civil Procedure states:
In the construction of a statute or instrument, the office of the judge is simply
to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not
to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where
there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible,
to be adopted as will give effect to all.
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1858 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
158. The Hicks majority may argue that because the legislature has not responded
to this holding, the court reached a conclusion consistent with the legislature. However,
as the Latimer court stated: "We have recognized that legislative inaction alone does
not necessarily imply legislative approval." Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1213, 858 P.2d at
618, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151.
159. The California Supreme Court's Jones decision is another foundational case
for imposing longer sentences. People v. Jones, 46 Cal. 3d, 585, 758 P.2d 1165, 250
Cal. Rptr. 636 (1988).
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reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the California Supreme
Court's decision to use its judicial resources to tack on another three
years to Hicks' sentence is that the court was achieving the broader
purpose of creating a harsher punishment for sex offenders of the
future. 160 Justice Mosk summed up the Hicks majority's opinion most
accurately: "A sentence like the one imposed here, that cannot possibly
be completed in the defendant's lifetime, makes a mockery of the law
,,161

MICHAEL

A.

BARMETTLER

160. Hicks, because of the numerous crimes committed and the manner in which
they were committed, was the perfect case for the California Supreme Court to achieve
this purpose. As the trial court judge imposing the sentences stated: "As far as I'm
concerned, this is one of the most egregious cases." People v. Hicks, 18 Cal. App. 4th
88, 99, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166, 172 (1992) (subsequently depublished).
161. Hicks, 6 Cal. 4th at 797, 863 P.2d at 723, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478.
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